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The (Bio)logical Fallacies of Luce Irigaray

	   Contemporary literary theory often leaves me feeling dispeptic and irritable, and Irigaray’s book embodies (to invoke the theme of this conference) many of the things that concern me, not only with theory but with the current state of graduate studies.  So the reason I’m about to so relentlessly critique something written over a decade ago—an eternity in literary scholarship—is that I think Irigaray’s work still has something to offer: It represents much of what is wrong with the current state of our discipline.

This Sex Which Is Not One, Luce Irigaray’s influential collection of essays, is celebrating its fifteenth anniversary in English translation.  And in that time, it has achieved the status of a “classic,” defined by Mark Twain as “a book which people praise and don’t read.”  The fact that many students of literary theory may not have actually read Irigaray does not keep them from responding to the mention of her name with a knowing nod and a reverential murmur of approval.  Even the person—like me—who knows nothing of classical music knows enough to smile and say, “Ah, Mozart,” when the composer’s name is mentioned.  It cannot be long before Irigaray’s name becomes an awkward adjective, like “Derridian” or “Kafkaesque.”  The staying power of Irigaray’s book suggests that its significance in the field of modern literary theory remains—if you will pardon the expression—seminal.

Luce Irigaray would not pardon the expression, indicative as it is of the phallocentric thrust of language.  This Sex Which Is Not One is often a difficult book to understand—intentionally so,  since Irigaray advocates the subversion of the dominant, phallocentric construct of clear, expository prose.  However, the central questions raised in This Sex Which Is Not One are clear enough, and regardless of whether Irigaray or anyone else succeeds in answering them, the asking alone has potentially important implications for society at large.  This is great praise indeed, and a compliment which cannot often be bestowed upon the incessant but largely irrelevant output of the lit. crit. Machine.  But sadly the social importance of Irigaray’s text remains merely potential, because her battlefield is verbal and theoretical, not actual.  Irigaray writes,
the feminine has never been defined except as the inverse, indeed the underside, of the
masculine.  So for woman it is not a matter of installing herself within this lack, this
negative, even by denouncing it, nor of reversing the economy of sameness by turning
the feminine into the standard for “sexual difference”; it is rather a matter of trying to
practice that difference.  Hence these questions: what other mode of reading or writing,
of interpretation and affirmation, may be mine inasmuch as I am a woman?  (159)
 [throughout, all italics are Irigaray’s]

To begin to answer her own question, to begin to imagine what a uniquely feminine discourse might look like, Irigaray interogates first that which precludes such a discourse: the inescapable, dominant, masculine discourse within which we all currently operate.  Decentering the dominant discourse is a difficult task, like asking fish to deconstruct the concept of water. In philosophical discourse, Irigaray finds the defining characteristics of phallocentric language, namely coherence, consistency, logic, and linearity.  Irigaray urges “an interpretive rereading” of dominant Western philosophical texts, for “it is indeed precisely philosophical discourse that we have to challenge, and disrupt, . . . inasmuch as it constitutes the discourse on discourse” (74).  Language in turn is a tool of power and oppression in our phallocratic society, by which women are reduced to mere commodities, to be exchanged by men as “obliging prop[s] for the enactment of man’s fantasies” (25).  For a woman, the alternative to submitting to the masculine framework is equally depressing: A woman may strive to beat the men at their own game, as it were, appropriating the masculine discourse and its attendant power for herself.  But in so doing, a woman has done nothing in Irigaray’s eyes toward establishing the “other”—the feminine—as distinct from the “one”—the masculine.  She has become merely “man’s equal,” a “potential man.”  For Irigaray, equality between the sexes does not subvert or even challenge the dominant discourse.
At this point I, as a typically empirical and goal-oriented male, ask, “Well, what then can we do to change things?”  For Irigaray, however, this question is not particularly interesting, especially if it’s coming from a man.  As David Richter observes, “Those feminists who seek above all a sense of the differences between femininity and masculinity may find Irigaray a compelling theorist; those more concerned with pragmatic goals—who prefer to get their share of the things men have traditionally dominated—may find her quietism less useful” (1072-3).
Irigaray could have turned outward from her thoughts and put into action the resentment which marks every page of her text.  She could have made This Sex Which Is Not One a work of symbolic action, a book significant outside the academy, a manifesto for overturning the tables in the female commodity exchange.  That such pragmatism is so thoroughly ignored in the text seems inexcusable, after Irigaray argues that male oppression of women is so pervasive that it infects not only every action but every utterance.  (For those who like this sort of thing, it was done earlier and with far more intensity, clarity, and humor—and with a powerful desire to actually change society—by Valerie Solonas in her SCUM Manifesto.)  But though Irigaray is also a psychoanalyst, she is primarily an academician.  So she turns inward, to the safe and sophisticated world of ideas, of texts, of interrogating “each word, utterance, sentence, . . . every phoneme, every letter” (80), descending into an ever-tighter spiral of deconstruction, until she winds up staring at her own navel (actually at a place slightly lower than her navel), in the end having destroyed nothing but strawmen.

Which may be just as well, since Irigaray fancies “destroying the discursive mechanism” itself (76), casting aside “any manipulation of discourse that would also leave discourse intact. . . .  We need to proceed in such a way that linear reading is no longer possible. . . .  There would no longer be either a right side or a wrong side of discourse, or even of texts” (80).  Here Irigaray walks down the well-trodden path of theorists before her who have followed their brilliance down the trail to utter nonsense, self-de(con)structing every instance in which their writings approach comprehensibility, and subverting every noble attempt made by a patient reader to take the author seriously.
As a metaphor for the non-linear, multiple, self-contained nature of feminine discourse, Irigaray writes in vivid anatomical detail about female auto-eroticism.  We literary scholars are often accused of mental masturbation; Irigaray seems to have taken this criticism as her thesis.  A woman
touches herself in and of herself without any need for mediation. . . .  Woman “touches herself” all the time, . . . for her genitals are formed of two lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two—but not divisible into one(s)—that caress each other. . . .  Her sexuality, always at least double, goes even further: it is plural. . . . Woman has sex organs more or less everywhere. . . .  This is doubtless why she is said to be whimsical, incomprehensible, capricious . . .  not to mention her language, in which “she” sets off in all directions leaving “him” unable to discern the coherence of any meaning.  (26, 28-9)
This all functions as a lead-in to a wise observation about male vs. female discourse, though it is an observation made elsewhere by others who actually apply it to improving real-world communication and understanding.  Feminine discourse is  “contradictory,”

somewhat mad from the standpoint of reason, inaudible for whoever listens to [it] with ready-made grids. . . .  One would have to listen with another ear, as if hearing an “other” meaning. . . .  For if “she” says something, it is not, it is already no longer, identical with what she means. . . .  It is useless, then, to trap women in the exact definition of what they mean, to make them repeat (themselves) so that it will be clear; they are already elsewhere in that discursive machinery where you expected to surprise them.  (29)
The pop-linguist Deborah Tannen, and even John Gray in his horrifically popular Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus, have observed fundamental differences between male and female patterns of verbal initiation and response.  But unlike Irigaray—who is too busy being brilliant, aloof, and ironic—both Tannen and Gray offer pragmatic suggestions for listening “with another ear.”  Irigaray does not go in this direction.  Since she believes language is a weapon used by men to “trap” women, she has no interest in the notion of successful communication.  In fact, her argument cannot even accommodate the phrase “successful communcation” as anything but an oxymoron.
But the quotes above and throughout her book reveal what appears to be a paradox: Irigaray embraces the sexist limitations men have placed upon the female intellect.  She has a response to this criticism, of course: By mimicking the repressive roles of femininity, women may “uncover the mechanisms by which [these roles] exploit” them (220).  To make matters worse, Irigaray also seizes in the name of women those stereotypes traditionally leveled against men.  In the above excerpts, for example, she says that women are in a constant state of sexual arousal, which is “doubtless” why they speak and act the way they do.  Furthermore, she relies heavily upon the hierarchical discourse and the sexist generalizations she claims to want destroyed.  She posits by necessity masculine oneness, narrowness, and linearity in order to differentiate feminine plurality, openness, and reflexivity.
Though there are many moments of original thought in This Sex Which Is Not One, there are also plenty of examples like these of Irigaray simply turning the tables in the human commodity exchange.  Irigaray’s tactics make it clear that behind all the verbal cleverness and the undeniable intellectual vitality is another wearying example of an angry scholar, feeling marginalized, trying to get even.  One of the favorite strawman fallacies of contemporary theory is the tactic of positing overly simplified hierarchical oppositions—such as masculine vs. feminine, or Derrida’s favorite: written vs. spoken discourse—and then boldly inverting them, as if any intelligent thinker supprted these simplistic dualities in the first place, or privileged one over the other.  This methodolgy fits hand in glove with the emotion of anger and the motive of revenge: you were once on top, but now we’re on top.  It’s just Stephen Potter’s one-upmanship, no matter how vehemently Irigaray calls “one” and “man” into question.
Another obstacle standing between Irigaray and relevance is her powerful ability to alienate her audience (although I’m probably giving her a run for her money right now).  This comes through most clearly in Chapter 7, entitled “Questions.”  It is not called “Questions and Answers” because Irigaray has that annoyingly smug habit, encountered in deconstructionists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, of turning the question back on the questioner, and of condescending to skeptics as dimwits who just don’t get it.  According to Irigaray’s translator, Catherine Porter, questions are “a habitual mode in Irigaray’s writing, because [they] introduce a plurality of voices and facilitate the examination of a priori concepts without, however, insisting upon definitive answers or revisions of the systems of thought that are brought into question” (221).  How terribly convenient.
“What is a woman?” asks a student from the Philosophy Department at the University of Toulouse.  Irigaray responds, “I believe I’ve already answered that there is no way I would ‘answer’ that question.  The question ‘what is . . . ?’ is the question—the metaphysical question—to which the feminine does not allow itself to submit” (122).  Isn’t that just the sort of response that makes you wish you’d dropped her class while you had the chance?  But her responses—such as they are—are not simply a maddening semantic mannerism—or (wo)mannerism.  They are rather an indication of that most phallocentric of failings: intellectual rigidity.  Irigaray attempts to preempt and silence all criticism of her work by saying the following:

As for what is signified by the reactions that a work such as mine may provoke, I think I have just responded to that: a person who is in a position of mastery does not let go of it easily, does not even imagine any other position. . . .  In other words, the “masculine” is not prepared to share the initiative of discourse.  (157)
In other words, if you disagree with her you are, by definition, part of the problem.  This rhetorical strategy has been used for centuries by a wide variety of cultural critics, including witch burners, McCarthyites, fundamentalist Christians, and dictators great and small.
	Irigaray’s notion of woman as self-contained and self-satisfying seems to be a justification for a thoroughly solipsistic theory of discourse and relationships.  Instead of owning what are clearly—to any reader with an ounce of psychological insight—her own issues of anger and resentment toward men, this psychoanalyst-who-should-know-better externalizes her personal biases as feelings common to all womankind.  A woman’s auto-eroticism “is disrupted by a violent break-in: the brutal separation of the two lips by a violating penis,” marking the “disappearance of her own pleasure in sexual relations” (24).  Any pleasure a woman may find in heterosexual union is “a masochistic prostitution of her body to a desire that is not her own” (25).  In the world as Irigaray sees it, a woman is “an indifferent, insignificant little receptacle, subject to their [men’s] demands alone” (208).  The entire last chapter—“When Our Lips Speak Together”—is divisively framed in terms of “us”—two female lovers—and “them”: men.  But also thrown into the “them” category are women who raise families, women who prefer sex to masturbation, heterosexual women, and women who dare to question Irigaray.
A more compassionate and evolved psychoanalyst, Rollo May, observes that in our era, the most common psychological defense against confronting and accepting our own emotions is intellectualization, avoiding the pain of raw emotion by reframing and externalizing it as a rational construct.  I think his observation is extremely important for us as scholars: Who could be more prone to intellectualization than intellectuals?
“You’re missing the point,” people may argue.  “Irigaray is being ironic.”  Indeed she is, and in fact she has given herself no choice: the linear, logical discourse she so loathes is the only medium she has for communicating her ideas.  Thus by characterizing communication and even language itself as the enemy, as “a trap,” Irigaray has thought herself into an intellectual endgame, joining many of her contemporaries in poststuctural and performativity theories: If language controls us and not vice versa, then the only way out is through parody, sarcasm, irony.  Much contemporary criticism is an intellectualization of the feeling we all share at some level, the feeling of being marginalized, of the loss of power and will.  To accept such a loss can only result in feelings of anger and resentment, expressed as cynicism and irony, moods and tones which are sadly—but not coincidentally—pervasive in English departments.  For our theories mirror not only our ideology, but our psychology.  I’m not against theory, per se; as H. L. Mencken said, “A professor must have theories as a dog must have fleas.”  But like all intellectualizations, theories such as Irigaray’s can only fail us: Such beliefs cannot empower their adherents since the theories are founded upon an acceptance of disempowerment, and are thus self-defeating.  That Irigaray is so revered is thus yet another indication that too many graduate students are looking to theory when they should really be looking into therapy.
To praise Irigaray’s insights, as I have tried at times to do, leaves an unpleasant taste in my mouth, like complimenting Rush Limbaugh on his success, or a Klansman on his neatly pressed hood.  This Sex Which Is Not One perpetuates and legitimizes the sexism which remains fashionable in academia, and fouls the worthy pursuit of feminist studies behind which it hides.  However appealing Irigaray’s rallying cry to an assault on hegemony may seem, her call must be taken for what it is: resentment intellectualized, divisiveness masquerading as a liberating philosophy.
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